Central Banks regularly make forecasts, such as the Fed's Greenbook forecast, that are conditioned on hypothetical paths for the policy interest rate. While there are good public policy reasons to evaluate the quality of such forecasts, up until now the most common approach has been to ignore the conditional nature and apply standard forecast efficiency tests. We state plausible assumptions as to the nature of the conditionality and derive forecast efficiency tests appropriate for conditional forecasts. Intuitively, these tests involve involve implicit estimates of the degree to which the conditioning path is counterfactual and of the magnitude of policy feedbacks over the forecast horizon. We apply the tests to the Greenbook forecast and Bank of England's inflation report forecast, finding some evidence of forecast inefficiency.
Introduction
Forecasts have long played a prominent role in the policy formation process at central banks. Recently, many central banks have begun to publish forecasts in real time in order to enhance the understanding of and justification for policy.
There are important public policy reasons to study the information content of these forecasts. As the forecasts play an important role in policy choice, the central banks (CBs) and public both have an interest in the forecasts being of high quality.
If published forecasts are part of a scheme to signal where policy is headed, the quality of the forecast is an important component of the signal-to-noise ratio for the signaling scheme. Further, some political-economy theories of policy derive implications based on the assumption that CB's have superior information about the economy (e.g, Canzoneri, 1985) . The relative forecasting precision of the public and CBs gives us a measure of the practical magnitude of any such advantage.
The nature of common CB forecasts is a significant stumbling block to analysis of these forecasts. The Federal Reserve's Greenbook forecast and the published forecasts of several inflation targeting CBs, are conditioned-in a particular sense detailed below-on a path for the policy interest rate over the forecast horizon. One standard case is conditioning on an unchanged path for the policy interest rate over the horizon. We will follow the literature in referring to these forecasts as conditional and contrasting them with unconditional forecasts, which are taken to be the CB's expectations for the variables in question, conditioned only on the CB's information at the time of the forecast.
In this paper, we derive and apply tests of forecast efficiency that are appropriate when evaluating conditional forecasts. Of course, there is a long history of evaluating the quality of the Greenbook forecast by simply treating it as an unconditional forecast, and applying standard forecast efficiency test. For example, Romer and Romer (2000) found that the Greenbook inflation forecast is superior to private sector forecasts. These same exercises are also being conducted on the published forecasts of other central banks (e.g., Andersson, et al. 2005; Bank of England, 2004) . One must take the results of this work with a grain of salt, given that the conclusions rest on an explicit or implicit assumption that the effects of conditioning can be neglected.
The view that the conditional nature of the expectations can be neglected could be justified by the twin assumptions that the conditioning paths are not too far from the CB's unconditional expectation for policy and that policy feedbacks are not too large over the relevant horizon. While these assumptions are surely valid for very short horizons, at longer horizons they become more tenuous.
By positing what we argue to be a reasonable structure relating the conditional and unconditional forecasts, we show that an appropriate test can be based on an augmented version of standard forecast efficiency regressions. The augmenting terms implicitly take account of the degree to which the conditioning path is counterfactual and the magnitude of policy feedbacks. Thus, we replace the twin assumptions by implicit estimates of the two components.
In the simplest case, we make a CB transparency assumption that private sector and CB interest rate expectations coincide. In this case, one can test forecast efficiency by running an OLS regression of the ex-post conditional forecast error on variables known at time t, and some augmenting variables. As in the standard case, the efficiency test checks whether the variables known at time t are systematically related to the forecast error. The augmenting variables are present to soak up any predictability of the conditional forecast error that is due to the effects of conditioning. Without the transparency assumption, an analogous test can be run, but we must instrument for the augmenting variables.
We present results of forecast efficiency tests of the Fed's Greenbook forecast and the Bank of England's (BOE's) Inflation Report forecast. The results illustrate the importance of taking conditioning seriously. Comparing our results to those that ignore the conditional nature, we find that taking the conditional nature seriously can strengthen or weaken the evidence against efficiency. We find some evidence against efficiency of the Greenbook GDP growth forecast for the current quarter or next quarter, and some evidence against the efficiency of the inflation forecast at horizons of a few quarters.
Perhaps the most important lesson from both the theoretical exercise and the applications is that the analysis of these conditional forecasts is quite subtle and difficult. In the conclusion, we argue that this presents a significant roadblock to monitoring the quality of the forecasting process.
Econometric theory
The basic setup is that we have a time series of conditional forecasts produced at CBs at various points in time. We would like to deduce whether the CB has used information efficiently in producing the conditional forecast. We do not have the CB's unconditional forecast, which the CB may not write down at all, let alone, publish. In any case, we refer to an unconditional forecast of the CB, by which we mean its expectation of the variables in question based on its information at the time of the forecast, but not on any counterfactual values of variables in the forecast period.
To define the test, let y t denote a forecast variable in quarter t. Output growth and inflation are the y variables in the application. Define the unconditional forecast of y t+h based on information available to the CB as of some time during quarter t to be y u t,t+h . As the forecast is made during quarter t, y t will not be, and y t−1 may not be, in the information set at t. Thus, it may be of interest to consider nonpositive h. We will focus on h = 0, . . . , H, where the maximum horizon, H, in our applications is 4. Let i t denote the policy interest rate in quarter t and let i u t,t+h denote the unconditional forecast of i t+h at time t.
Our maintained model is that
where ε t,t+h is uncorrelated with anything in the central bank's information set at t and x t is a vector of variables in the central bank's information set at t.
We are interested in testing forecast efficiency, implications of which are:
γ y,h = 0 for all h
The challenge is that y u t,t+h and i u t,t+h are unobserved-instead CBs banks report one or more conditional forecasts, denoted y c t,t+h and i c t,t+h . Our proposal for testing these hypotheses is based on a technically simple assumption about the relation between the conditional and unconditional forecasts. In section 3, we argue that our assumption is reasonable and the argument is developed more completely in Faust and Leeper (2005) . In this section, we simply state the assumption and derive some econometric implications.
The key assumption and implied tests
A 1 i) The unconditional and conditional forecasts are related by the following system of equations:
ii) The βs satisfy
h = 0, . . . , H and j <= h for some β * , h = 0, . . . , H.
Part i says that the difference between the conditional and unconditional forecast for y t+h is linear in the h + 1 terms describing the difference between the unconditional and conditional paths for interest rates. The H + 1 equations in part i have (H + 2)(H + 1)/2 coefficients β. Part ii states that these βs satisfy a simple set of restrictions with only H + 1 free parameters. Intuitively, the i c − i u variables capture the degree to which the conditioning assumption is counterfactual and the βs capture the degree of policy feedbacks.
The structure of the issue may be clearer if we stack the H + 1 equations in (3).
In a natural notation, we have
where Y c = (y c t,t , . . . , y c t,t+H ) ′ and the other superscript c and u variables are defined analogously. Part i of the assumption imposes that B is lower triangular. Part ii imposes that
We will consider efficiency tests that impose only i but not ii and tests that impose both i and ii.
To derive what we call the test under transparency, substitute y u t,t+h from the maintained model (1) into (3): This might reasonably be viewed as a test of efficiency of y u t,t+h or of y c t,t+h . More precisely, it is a joint test of the hypothesis that y c t,t+h can be related to some latent, efficient unconditional forecasts, y u t,t+h and i u t,t+h in the manner stated in A1.
All the variables in (7) are directly measured, except for i u t+h . Central banks report the conditional forecast variables, y t is the ex-post value of the forecasted variable, 1 and for the xs we can use any variable known to the central bank at t.
In section 3, we will argue that under a central bank transparency assumption, i u t+h is, in principle, measurable. Thus, we report results for the test just described. This is a strong assumption, however.
We can also construct a test that is valid when i u is not observed. To do so, substitute for i u t+h in (7) using (2):
Collect the terms in x and the terms in ε to write, Second,ε t,t+h is a composite of efficient forecast errors and, thus, shares with the other εs the property of being orthogonal to any variable in the central bank's information set at t.
Given the second property, any variable in the CB information set at t will be a valid instrument for the i c − i variables in (8). Thus, we can estimate the coefficients of (8) consistently by instrumenting for the i c − i variables, and any valid test that γ = 0 will be a test of the joint validity of H y + H i .
There are two differences between the IV-based test and the OLS-based test under transparency. We have replaced i u with the ex post realization, i. This forces us to use IV to properly soak up the effects of conditioning. Second, the test is now a test of the joint efficiency of the y and i forecasts. The OLS-based test was directed at the y forecast alone.
The principle requirement for valid x variables and for valid instruments is the same: both must come from the CBs information set at t so that under the null they are orthogonal toε t,t+h . One could partition such variables into xs and instruments, z, but there may be no strong basis upon which to make such a distinction.
A natural way to proceed is to lump all the potential xs and zs together as instruments, and then to estimate equation (8) with no γ terms by IV. Then one can test any over-identifying assumptions.
More concretely, we estimate,
by instrumental variables using any collection of variables in the CB's information set at t as instruments. We then test any overidentifying restrictions using the Sargan (1958) test or its generalization in Hansen's J test in the GMM context.
Intuitively, this tests whether the instruments explain the residuals from (9); that is, it tests whether the instruments collectively explain the forecast error, y c − y, above and beyond their ability to explain i c − i.
Valid instruments and identification
We need to instrument for variables of the form i c t,t+h − i t+h using variables in the central bank's information set at t. Since the conditioning path for interest rates is deliberately counterfactual, and since i c is in the information set, one natural instrument is i c t,t+h − i f t,t+h where i f is any interest rate forecast in the central bank's information set and for which we have data. We will use the forward rate in financial markets as our measure of i f . More generally, any variable that helps predict interest rates may be correlated with i c − i.
In the single equation test, we estimate (9) by IV and have h + 1 variables to instrument for. Identification requires that the projection matrix from projecting the h + 1 (i c − i) variables on the instruments be of rank h + 1. For h larger than 0 or 1, the structure of the problem suggests that this may be a problem.
The h + 1 endogenous variables are interest rate differentials, i c − i, at successive horizons. Each can be written i c − i u + ε, and our instruments will be correlated only with the i c − i u component. Both i c and i u tend to have very smooth paths; thus, i c − i u may itself have a variance-covariance matrix that is nearly singular, implying that our projection matrix may be nearly singular as well.
The rank condition for identification may not be such a problem when we treat the equations as a system and impose the cross equation restrictions on the βs.
Consider estimating the system for horizons zero through H by GMM. Let z t,h be a vector of k h instruments to be used in forming the moment conditions in equation
The sufficient condition for identification of the H + 1 β * s is that the gradient of the moment conditions with respect to the parameter values has full column rank.
Given the restrictions on the β * s in A1(ii), this requires that the K × (H + 1) matrix
This identifying restriction is far easier to meet than the one in the single equation case: it can, for example, be satisfied using the same single instrument for each equation. Specifically, if there is a variable, z t , for which E((i c t,t − i t )z t ) = 0 and we use this an and instrument for each equation, we will satisfy the rank condition.
To see this, note that in this case the main diagonal of Π will be a constant and nonzero, which is sufficient for full rank of a lower triangular matrix. This result follows under A1(ii) from the lower triangular nature of B in (6). Overall, even for large H, the system is likely to be formally identified; it is still possible, of course, that the identification will be weak.
Weak identification
Either in single-equation estimation, or in the system, the identification assumption might fail, meaning that the matrix Π may be rank deficient, or nearly rank deficient. This, in turn, would imply that our tests of overidentifying restrictions would have size distortions. Fortunately, there are approaches to inference that are robust to weak identification and even a complete lack of identification. These weak instrument issues can make inference about the βs quite complicated. In the case at hand, however, the βs are essentially nuisance parameters: we are mainly interested in testing γ = 0, or, equivalently, in testing overidentifying restrictions.
To understand the robust test, it is useful to review inference regarding a parameter vector θ, that could be either the βs in the single equation framework or the β * s in the system. Suppose that θ 0 is a hypothesized parameter vector in (9) and S(θ) denotes the continuous updating GMM objective function based on K moment conditions (S(θ) reduces to LIML in the single equation case, and FIML in the system case). The distribution of S(θ 0 ) is asymptotically χ 2 (K) under the null hypothesis of forecast efficiency, independent of the rank of Π (Anderson and Rubin, 1949; Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock and Wright, 2000; Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002) . If c(α, K) is the upper α percentile of a χ 2 (K) distribution, then the set
where Θ is the parameter space, is a confidence set for θ with asymptotic coverage of 100 − α percent. Under weak identification, this confidence set has infinite expected volume (Dufour, 1997) , and hence is uninformative. If the moment conditions are false, in the sense that no parameter value satisfies them, then S is empty with probability one asymptotically.
This suggests a valid test of any overidentifying implied by the moment conditions that is robust to whether there is are any overidentifying restrictions at all.
We reject if
This test will be asymptotically conservative in that it will reject the null with probability less than or equal to α asymptotically.
Note that making the usual assumption of identification, and using the LIML or FIML estimator, the Sargan test (or Hansen's J-test) of overidentifying restrictions
where p is the dimension of β. Thus, the robust test merely raises the critical value by taking the value from the χ 2 (K) distribution instead of the χ 2 (K−p) . Clearly, if the rank condition for identification is satisfied, using the robust test wastes power. In the tables below we report both standard and robust p-values.
Tests are available that may provide some suggestion which p-values may be more appropriate. For example, the rank test of Cragg and Donald (1993) is a generalization of the simple first-stage F statistic to the case of multiple regressors. This test can be used to test the null hypothesis that the matrix Π is rank deficient, and, thus, provides a test of the null of weak identification. It is well known that even if this test rejects a lack of identification at conventional significance levels, weak instrument problems in the second stage may still be severe in small samples (Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox, 1996; Staiger and Stock, 1997; and Stock and Yogo, 2001 ). Accordingly, our inclination is emphasize the robust p-values, except when the rejection from the rank test is particularly strong.
Instrument selection
While we are concerned about the possibility of weak identification, we do have a large number of potentially valid instruments that are likely to be highly correlatedthis includes any variable in the information set at t that may predict interest rates.
Thus, we are faced with an instrument selection problem. Donald and Newey (2001) propose a simple criterion for selecting the optimal number of instruments in estimating a single equation. Assuming that the available instruments can be ordered from most to least relevant, they show that choosing the number of instruments from this ordered list to minimize the Mallows (1973) criterion in the first-stage regression also minimizes the asymptotic mean square error of the structural coefficient estimates. 3 We are most interested in maximizing power of the overidentifying restrictions test (without distorting size), but it seems reasonable to suppose more precise estimates of the β will aid our goal, although these are different objectives. Thus, we use the Donald and Newey (2001) criterion in some of our single equation tests.
Concretely, we select a set of h + 1 baseline instruments for each equation that (generically) are sufficient to give one overidentifying restriction, we then us the Donald-Newey criterion to choose additional instruments from a pool of candidates.
That is, holding fixed the baseline instruments, we choose the combination of additional instruments that minimizes minimize the criterion. 4
Economics of conditional forecasts
The results in the previous section all rest on A1, which posits a simple relation between conditional and unconditional forecasts. In this section, we describe natural economic structures in which A1 holds and discuss the transparency assumption upon which one of our tests rests.
Suppose that each period the CB forms an unconditional forecast. We place no restrictions on how this is formed; rather, two conventional assumptions on how the conditional forecast is generated will imply that A1 holds. First, assume that the conditional forecasts are formed consistent with Leeper and Zha's (2003) formulation of modest policy interventions-that is, they are treated as a sequence of hypothesized policy shocks of a modest magnitude relative to the unconditional forecast. 5
Second, assume that in a modest neighborhood of the unconditional forecast, the responses of all relevant variables to the policy shock are linear in the shock and well approximated by the conventionally defined impulse responses of the variables to a policy shock.
Under these assumptions, the conditional forecast paths can be written as a deviation from the unconditional forecast using the impulse response functions:
where the impulse responses of y and i to a policy shock at horizon j are given by d j and g j , respectively. The second equation implicitly defines the policy shocks, w s , that are implied by the conditional and unconditional path for rates. In matrix notation, these equations can be written,
where the Y and I variables are defined as in (5), and
Note that, say, in the Greenbook forecast, the paths for certain other variables than the policy rate (such as exchange rates and some other financial market prices) are specified and taken as given in generating the remainder of the forecast. This might be taken to mean that there is more than one counterfactual path in the conditional forecast and that our tests need to soak up the effects of other conditioning assumptions. We believe that this is not the case; in particular, we believe that only the policy rate forecast is deliberately counterfactual. These other conditioning variables are best thought of as being forecast in another sub-model. We believe that the paths for these variables are meant to be consistent with the overall forecast.
the lower triangular, Toeplitz matrix with d j on the j th subdiagonal; G = Q(g) is analogously defined. Thus,
where B = DG −1 . Of course, this is the form required in A1.
This reasoning gives a coherent recipe for generating forecasts that are conditional in a sense close to what central bank forecasts are probably based on. Making more definite statements than this is difficult because the CB forecasts are heavily judgmental and involve inputs from many different models and analysts.
We can say a bit more in defense of A1. Goodhart (2005) These findings warrant two additional comments. First, we can include an error in (3), which is now written as an identity. We will not detail all the cases for the single-equation and system tests and for the transparency and standard tests. To To retain proper size of the test, there can be an error in (3); it can be correlated with (i c − i u ) but not with any x variables.
Second, strictly speaking we need A1 to hold under the null hypothesis. Thus, so long as the deviations from A1 are reflective of inefficiency in the forecasting system, rejections stemming from deviations from A1 are appropriate.
Additional restrictions
The interpretation of the βs given above suggests some additional restrictions that might sharpen our inferences. In particular, the IV estimates of the βs implicitly estimate policy feedbacks from monetary policy shocks to the forecast variable.
Conventional reasoning about these feedbacks suggests restrictions on these βs that we might want to impose.
For example, under conventional reasoning a positive shock to the policy interest rate has a nonpositive effect on output for at least a few quarters. The sign of the βs in the inflation equation is not so clear. Some evidence and theory supports the view that the positive cost effect of higher interest rates could cause inflation to rise in the short run following a policy tightening. For a more complete discussion of this type of sign restrictions, see Faust (1998) ; for our purposes, the empirical controversies about these effects is not crucial.
What we are interested in is the βs that the CB (implicitly) uses in creating the conditional forecast. Thus, for example, we are not interested in whether or not positive interest rate shocks initially raise inflation; rather, we are interested in whether a rise in the CB conditional policy path leads the CB to raise or lower the conditional forecast for inflation. We suspect that a rise in the policy path leads to nonpositive effects on both inflation and output growth at short horizons.
We will report estimates under versions of the following assumption:
A 2 If the conditional policy path is such that The assumption says that raising the conditional path by a constant c for horizons 0 through r weakly lowers the conditional forecast for y over the same horizon.
We will report results not imposing this assumption, and imposing it for small values of r: r = 0, 1, 2. Technically, imposing this assumption for a given r implies that r h=0 β h ≤ 0.
The transparency assumption
As discussed above, a particularly simple efficiency test would be possible if the CB's unconditional forecast for the policy rate were observed. This is not, however, the case. We consider the following transparency assumption:
A 3 The public's unconditional expectation of the policy interest rate is the same as that of the central bank.
Under this assumption, we can substitute a measure of public interest rate expectations for i u in performing the efficiency test. We will use a measure of expectations taken from financial markets as our proxy for public interest rate expectations.
Of course, financial market proxies may diverge from true expectations by a potentially time-varying risk premium. It is well-known that this is a very serious issue when using interest rates of over a year (e.g, Chernenko, et al. 2004 ).
We can, of course, test whether our proxy data for rate expectations seem to constitute efficient forecasts of subsequent interest rates. We report one such test in Table 1 below. Consistent with other work in this area we find that our financialmarket-based proxies for interest rate expectations seem to be efficient predictors out at most one or two quarters.
We put forward the transparency results mainly as an important benchmark. 
Empirical application
In this section we apply the tests described above to the Greenbook forecast of the Federal Reserve and to the inflation report forecast of the Bank of England. As noted in the introduction, the properties of these forecasts have been studied before both by the CBs and by outsiders. Romer and Romer (2000) found that the Greenbook forecast is superior to private sector alternatives; Sims's (2002) reaches a similar conclusion, while being more critical about a number of particulars. Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and are less supportive of the Greenbook forecast. Work by the Bank of
England (2004) shows that their inflation forecast is pretty good by conventional standards, but the GDP forecast is not as good. Pagan (2003) reviews the BOE's forecasting framework and forecast and finds generally favorable results.
Perhaps more relevant to our distinction between the conditional and uncondi-tional forecast, several authors, (e.g., Faust and Henderson, 2004; Goodhart, 2005) have argued that the BOE's forecast has some odd properties when viewed as a conditional forecast. 7 In particular, while the forecast is conditioned on a constant path for policy, forecast inflation tends to return to target over a horizon of two-years.
This would seem to indicate that the policymakers never expect to need to change policy in order to hit the inflation objective. Policy rate changes were, however, frequent and highly serially correlated over this period (as with most CBs in most periods). Tests explicitly taking account of the conditional nature of the forecast could potentially shed some light on such issues.
The Data
We use the Greenbook forecast of output and inflation measured as GDP and the GDP deflator for all Greenbook forecasts between Oct. 1988 through the last Greenbook in 1999. This gives a total of 85 observations given the FOMC schedule and absence of Greenbook forecasts during first half of 1996. For more complete details on the raw data and data construction, see the Appendix.
We use the GDP and RPIX inflation forecast data published by the BOE in quarterly inflation reports from 1998:1 through 2003:2, giving 22 observations. 8
The Greenbook sample ends about 5 years ago due to confidentiality requirements of the Fed. The BOE sample ends about 2 years ago to allow us to have reasonably mature "final" data for creating forecast errors for GDP. Because we have almost 4 times as many observations for the Greenbook forecast relative to the BOE forecast, we expect to have considerably greater power to reject the efficiency hypothesis if it does not hold.
The inflation and output data are stated as approximate growth rates measured as 400 times the quarterly log change in the variable. While the RPIX inflation rate is not revised, the other three variables are perpetually revised, giving rise to an issue regarding what to treat as the final data in computing forecast errors. From 7 Other inflation targeting banks show this same phenomenon in their forecasts (Leeper, 2003) . 8 Our sample does not currently span the change in price indices by the BOE.
a forecasting standpoint, a key issue is whether the revisions are forecastable, and in the U.K. but not the U.S. the revisions are significantly forecastable. 9 For the "final" data, we use the data as they stood about 2 years after the time of the forecast.
Our data also include the interest rate path, i c , upon which the forecasts are based from the same sources. These are stated as quarterly average interest rates in annualized percent.
We also require a measure of private sector expectations of the policy interest rate. For the U.S., we use a measure created from Federal Funds rate and eurodollar futures. For the U.K. we use the financial market-based measure of expectations published by the BOE in the inflation report. For more details, see the Appendix.
Concrete varieties of the tests
There is a very large number of tests we could report based on different permutations of testing assumptions and choices of instruments and augmenting forecast variables.
To keep this somewhat manageable, we have made the following choices.
First consider the OLS-based tests. Here we take our financial-market-based measure of interest rate expectations, i f t,t+h and form regressors δ(c, f ) t,t+h = i c t,t+h − i f t,t+h . Then we use a conventional (robust) Wald test to test γ = 0 in the regression, 10
For comparison purposes, we run what we call a naive version of the test which omits the summation term. This is a natural test of efficiency under the assumption that the fact of conditioning can be neglected. The transparency version of the test includes the summation terms.
We consider two sets of xs, both of which include a constant. First, we include only y c t,t+h . This is the natural generalization of the familiar Mincer-Zarnowitz test to the present case; we call this the MZ set. The second set is called the XX , a) is the differential between the conditional path and ex post or 'a'ctual realization. We must instrument for the δs. We always include a constant in the instruments. As argued above, δ(c, f ) t,t+h should be a reasonably efficient predictor of δ(c, a) t,t+h and is in the CB information set at t. Thus, we always include δ(c, f ) for horizons zero through h. As supplementary or augmenting instruments we consider NZ and XX variants. The NZ variant only includes y c t,t+h . The XX version uses y c t,t+h and also uses the Donald-Newey criterion to choose further augmenting instruments from among δ(c, f ) t,t+h+j , j = 1, . . . , H and y c t,t+j , j = 0, . . . , H, j = h. The selection is made separately for each equation and the same set of augmenting instruments is used as the XX set of regressors in the OLS tests above.
We have a much greater range of possible choices in the system. As noted above, no matter how large is our chosen maximum horizon H, one instrument may be sufficient for identification. We report systems of equations 0 through H for H = 1, . . . , 4. For each equation, h, in the system, we include a constant as an instrument and include δ(c, u) t,t+h . We again consider two choices of additional instruments. In the NZ variant, we include y c t,t+h among the instruments for equation h. In the XX variant, we instead include y c t,t as the additional instrument in each equation. 11
The Naive and Transparency Tests
The OLS-based tests under the naive and transparency assumption for the Greenbook illustrate several important points (Table 2a-b) . First, there is a fairly general rejection of forecast efficiency under these assumptions for the Greenbook: throughout the tables, many of the p-values are quite small. Second, in many instances, the p-value for rejecting forecast efficiency are smaller in the transparency case than in the naive version. 12 One might have incorrectly supposed that naively treating the conditional forecast as unconditional would lead to rejections of forecast efficiency and that taking account of conditionality would lead to less rejections. As the Tables illustrate, this need not be the case. Taking account of the role of the conditioning error may increase the precision of the regression and allow one to more clearly measure the role of the additional xs in the regression.
Third, the ∆R 2 statistics shed some light on economic significance. These are the change in the uncentered R 2 due to including the x variables, and, as such, they form a crude estimate of how much better the forecast might have been had the x been used better. In the naive form of the test, these numbers are often quite substantial, in the 0.15 to 0.30 range. These values are much smaller in the transparency form of the test, suggesting that (despite the sharper rejection efficiency) the economic significance of the inefficiency may be rather modest.
The U.K. results are broadly similar. Given that we have about one-quarter as many observations in this case, the strength of the rejections might seem surprising.
As noted above, the GDP forecast, in particular, has been found to be problematic in the past. In the case of U.K. GDP growth, the ∆R 2 statistics suggest that inefficiency might be nontrivial in economic terms.
In the end, however, we prefer this think of these results mainly as illustrative benchmarks. One must remember that the transparency results are premised on the assumption that public and central bank rate expectations coincide and that our proxy taken from financial markets is an accurate measure of those expectations.
The transparency assumption is surely too strong, and the Of course, central banks seem to rely on these same proxies. 13 We do not require that the proxy be an efficient forecast, only that it be an accurate reflection of CB rate expectations.
The GMM, IV-based tests
The IV-based tests do away with the transparency assumption, at the expense of requiring instrumental variables estimation. For both the single-equation and system estimates (Tables 3 and 4 , respectively), the rank test reported in the final two columns, very generally indicates that weak instrument issues may be serious. The primary exception to this conclusion is for short horizons in the case of the U.S.
At the zero or one quarter horizons, the single-equation test of the Greenbook GDP growth forecast (Table 3a) generally rejects efficiency; the system estimates (4a) also provide some evidence against efficiency. At longer horizons, the robust pvalues are most appropriate, and provide little if any evidence against the efficiency hypothesis.
For the Greenbook inflation forecast the story is different. There is not solid evidence against efficiency at any horizon. At the horizon of 2 to 3 quarters, some of conventional p-values suggest rejecting efficiency, especially for larger values of r so that the effect of policy shocks is required, as in A2, to be nonpositive for a longer period.
Taking these conventional p-values seriously for a moment, it is worth stressing the interpretation. There is relatively strong evidence against efficiency of the inflation forecast, so long as we assume that artificially high interest rates in the conditioning path have nonpositive effects on inflation in the conditional forecast (relative to the unconditional).
As for the U.K. forecasts, there is no evidence against forecast efficiency in the IV-based estimates. This might seem surprising given the OLS-based results, where rejections were plentiful. In part, the explanation comes from the fact that we have very few observations for the U.K. (only 22).
We do not mean to suggest, however, that in light of the OLS estimates, failure to reject efficiency in the IV estimates is simply an issue of lack of power. It is perfectly possible that neither result is in error. As noted above, the way to reconcile the two results is with the conclusion that central bank and private sector expectations for interest rates are very different, and this difference in opinions over rates is of sufficiently great economic significance as to drive the difference in results.
Conclusion
Central banks commonly make forecasts conditional on counterfactual paths for the policy interest rate. Evaluating the quality of such forecasts is complicated. Lacking a better method, up until now, these forecasts have generally been evaluated as if the conditional nature could appropriately be neglected. As our results illustrate, ignoring the conditional nature can lead to either type I or type II errors in tests of forecast efficiency.
We show how to test efficiency under a plausible assumption about the relation between the conditional and underlying unconditional forecast. We illustrate these tests by considering the Fed's Greenbook forecast and Bank of England's Inflation Report forecast. Under a very strong transparency assumption, we find some evidence against efficiency of both the Greenbook and BOE forecast. Under weaker assumptions, we still find some evidence against efficiency of the Greenbook forecast.
Perhaps the most important conclusion from the paper is that it takes relatively strong assumptions to coherently analyze these conditional forecasts. While our assumptions are plausible, the appropriateness of each of our assumptions is open to question. Even if the assumptions are correct, we argue that the nature of the problem is likely to lead to weak instrument issues, requiring a robust approach to inference. Although we find some evidence against efficiency of the Greenbook forecast even under the robust procedure, such procedures make it very difficult to draw sharp conclusions.
In short, even substantial inefficiency in the forecasting framework of the central bank would be very difficult to detect based on conditional forecasts. In our view, the conditional nature presents a significant roadblock to the straightforward analysis of the quality of the forecasts. This issue may be particularly important in the case of the BOE and other inflation targeting central banks, which put the forecasts forward as an important element facilitating monitoring of the central bank.
Data Appendix
Our Greenbook data come from internal historical archives of the Greenbook forecast. A version these data is available on the Philadelphia Fed web site. The BOE forecast data are available from the BOE website.
For the U.S., our "final" vintage data come from the historical Greenbook archives. The final data are the data as they stood at the time of the first Greenbook at least two years after the from which the forecast is taken.
For the U.K., no vintage data are needed for the RPIX. For GDP growth, we use the vintage of data 2-years after the inflation report in question. Most of these data are posted on the BOE web site. For certain vintages, we augment the BOE data with data typed in from original sources.
The private sector expectations data for the U.S. are constructed from federal funds rate futures and eurodollar futures data in a standard manner described in Faust, et al. (2005b) . The BOE expectations data are reported in the relevant inflation reports.
The inflation and GDP data are converted from the basis reported to approximate annualized percent changes computed as 400 log(x t /x t−1 ).
We start our forecasts at horizon zero. That is, the forecast in quarter t of quarter t data. Both the interest rate conditioning assumption and the public expectations are stated on a quarterly-average-of-daily-data basis. Since these data are available in real time, the forecast for the current quarter made, say, 23 days into the current 91-day quarter, must be constructed as an average of the 23 days of actual data and the forecast (conditional or otherwise) going forward. We construct the data in the appropriate way based on a choice of when the forecast is made in the quarter. For the Greenbook forecast, we know the day that the forecast was completed. In the case of the inflation reports, this is not so clear. We use a date about a week before publication. The actual dates chosen are available from the authors. 
and p-val is the associated p-value from the asymptotic χ 2 distribution of the statistic under the null. The βs are constrained as in A2 through horizon r. The columns S, p-val., and robust report the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and standard and robust p values, respectively. The column labelled "rank" and the following p-val. column give the Cragg and Donald test statistic and p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that the rank condition for identification fails. If the rank condition fails to hold, the robust p-values of the Sargan test will be more reliable. The MZ and XX instrument sets are described in the text. Table 4a . System forecast efficiency tests: Table 4b . System forecast efficiency tests: Table 4c . System forecast efficiency tests: for horizon zero through h. The βs are constrained across equations as in (4) and the βs are constrained as in A2 through horizon r. The columns S, p-val., and robust report the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and standard and robust p values, respectively. The column labelled "rank" and the following p-val. column give the Cragg and Donald test statistic and p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that the rank condition for identification fails. If the rank condition fails to hold, the robust p-values of the Sargan test will be more reliable. The MZ and XX instrument sets are described in the text.
